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NO FEES PLEASE: A DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN RULE IN
TRADEMARK AND PATENT CIVIL ACTIONS
Joseph M. Esposito*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a small-time inventor seeking a patent for your
new, groundbreaking invention. As an initial matter, I commend your
inventive spirit, and would mention that you are in good company. 1 Before
you may claim protection for your creation, you must submit your
application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) so
that it can be reviewed and approved. The required information regarding
your patent seems limited, and although you feel what is requested from you
is not fully sufficient to display the uniqueness and innovativeness of your
invention, you adhere to the process. After determining which application
fits your particular needs, you send your application and eagerly await its
approval.2
DENIED. Surely this can’t be right? You have the opportunity to have
your application reexamined,3 and feeling confident that a mistake has been
made, you request such reexamination. A single rejection of your creation
surely is not enough to defeat your spirit.
DENIED. One denial may have been a lark, but two? Your invention is
groundbreaking! How could they not see the uniqueness and potential of
your creation? In the back of your mind you may be concerned that your
invention isn’t as original as you initially thought, but have no fear, for the
code allows for another appeal. This time, the appeal is to the Patent Trial
*
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1
The USPTO recently celebrated the issuance of its ten millionth patent. U.S. DEPT.
COM., 10 Million Patents: A Celebration of American Innovation, USPTO (June 14, 2018),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2018/06/10-million-patents-celebration-americaninnovation.
2
There are four different types of patent applications available, depending on what an
applicant seeks to patent and in what form. See Types of Patent Applications and
Proceedings, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-pat
ent-applicationsproceedings (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
3
35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018) (“[If after receiving notice of rejection, and] the applicant
persists in [his or her] claim for a patent . . . the patent shall be reexamined.”).
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and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), so long as the additional required fee does not
dissuade you.4
DENIED. This couldn’t possibly be happening again!
Your
interminable persistence cannot be extinguished by a board comprised of
people who clearly do not understand the magnitude of your creation.
Though it is possible that the patentability of your creation is a closer call
than you initially thought, there is still another path to vindication, but this
one diverges into two mutually exclusive options of judicial review: an
appeal based on the record established by the USPTO and nothing more,5 or
a civil action that allows for introduction of new evidence which may allow
you to turn this close call into a success.6 While the latter choice does come
at quite a higher cost,7 you have enough money to cover both your lawyer’s
fees and the costs incurred by the USPTO in the process of the litigation.
Understanding the greater financial burden that is required of you for what
you feel is a more thorough review, you press on to the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.8
DENIED. Maybe at this point the interminable persistence has turned
terminable, but knowing the risks associated with the more expensive path,
you lick your wounds and prepare to pay the price. Although the United
States has long practiced the American Rule,9 and the statute said nothing
about attorney’s fees, the court still requires you to pay the government’s
attorney’s fees. Maybe after multiple rounds of defeat, you can still afford
to continue the legal battle to vindicate your grand invention or trademark,
but just as likely, it has finally dawned on you that what you initially thought
was a slam dunk patent or trademark application is not quite so. You turn
around and head home, with insult of attorney’s fees added to injury of your
now slimmer wallet.
4
35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (“An applicant [who has been twice rejected may appeal to the
PTAB after] having once paid the fee for such an appeal.”). This fee varies depending on the
entity appealing: $325 for a micro entity, $650 for a small entity, and $1300 for an entity not
defined as a small or micro entity. 37 C.F.R. § 41.20(b)(3) (2017).
5
35 U.S.C. § 141 (allowing a patent applicant to appeal the decision of the PTAB under
§ 134(a) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); id. § 144 (restricting
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the record before the PTAB.).
6
Id. § 145 (allowing a patent applicant to bring a civil action regarding the decision of
the PTAB under § 134(a) to the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia); see Kappos
v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445–46 (2012) (“[T]here are no limitations on a patent applicant’s
ability to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding beyond those already present in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
7
35 U.S.C. § 145 (“All the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant.”).
8
Id. (“An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the [PTAB] under section 134(a)
may . . . have remedy . . . in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia[.]”).
9
For discussion of the American Rule, see infra Part II.C.
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But do you have to pay the attorney’s fees of the USPTO? Currently,
there is a circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of two statutes that
ask the applicant to pay “all the expenses” or “all expenses” of a proceeding
in a trademark or patent civil action.10 This Comment argues that the
interpretation of the aforementioned language to include attorney’s fees runs
afoul of the American Rule, defies both the language of the statute and the
intent of Congress, and does more harm than it does good. Part II of this
Comment will briefly discuss the history of the Patent Act, the avenues of
appeal that it establishes, the history and principles of the American Rule,
and Supreme Court precedent regarding the rule. Part III will discuss a
circuit split that has recently developed regarding awarding attorney’s fees
in the context of trademark and patent litigation. Part IV will show that the
proper and principled approach to resolving this circuit split is to adopt the
holding in Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu,11 which concluded that attorney’s fees
are not encompassed within the “all expenses” language. Part V will briefly
conclude and encourage the Supreme Court to adopt this holding.
II. AMERICAN RULE AND APPEAL
A. Brief History of the Patent Act
The American patent system was created by the Patent Act of 179012
with the intention of “promot[ing] the progress of useful arts . . . granting to
[a patent owner] the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or
discovery.”13 Initially, the power to approve and grant a patent was
delegated to a three-party panel consisting of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General.14 This trio operated under the

10
The statute in question in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), 15
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3), comes from the Lanham Act, which is concerned with trademark civil
actions and uses the language “all the expenses.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2018). The
statute in question in Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 35 U.S.C. § 145, uses the language “all
expenses.” See 35 U.S.C. § 145; Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(en banc), cert. granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019). This Comment discusses the
Patent Act and its historical development at length primarily because the Lanham Act adopted
the Patent Act’s structure for trademark appeals and civil actions, and has the support of
congressional intent for the position that attorney’s fees were not to be included outside
“exceptional cases.” See infra notes 37, 125 and accompanying text. For clarity, this note
will use the phrase “all expenses” or “all the expenses of the proceeding” as a reference to the
language used in both statutes.
11
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1188.
12
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-12.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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Department of State.15 In 1836, Congress established what is now known as
the USPTO as an independent agency, still within the Department of State,
and headed by a Commissioner of Patents.16 Below the Commissioner of
Patents were patent examiners, who examined patent applications in place of
the three-party panel, and whose decisions were appealable to an internal
board.17 The agency was subsequently shifted to the Department of the
Interior,18 then to the Department of Commerce, where it remains today.19
The Patent Act of 1952 codified the sections which are the subject of the
current circuit split, though the language used has been only slightly altered
over the years.20
B. Path to Judicial Review
The Patent Act of 1952 provides a system to either apply for the
protection a registered patent provides and appeal or bring a civil action after
a patent application is denied. An inventor or owner of a patent may file a
patent application to the USPTO for approval by a USPTO examiner
assigned to the application. If the patent application is denied, the applicant
has the right to request that the application be reexamined.21 If the patent
application is denied twice, the applicant may appeal the decision of the
USPTO examiner to the PTAB for reexamination.22 If after the Board’s
deliberation, it affirms the rejection of the patent application, the applicant
has two mutually exclusive options for judicial review: an appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or a civil action in the Eastern District of
Virginia.23 There are two notable differences between these options: the
15
See id.; P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237,
237–38 (1936) (“The business of administering the act was organized in the Department of
State. The act provided that this Department keep the books and records, receive the papers
filed, and perform other duties.”).
16
Act of July 4, 1836, ch.. 357, §§ 1, 2, 5, 7 Stat. 117.
17
Id. § 7.
18
Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395.
19
See 15 U.S.C. § 1511(4) (2018)(“The [USPTO] shall be under the jurisdiction and
subject to the control of the Secretary of Commerce”); 35 U.S.C. §1(a) (“The [USPTO] is
established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce.”).
20
Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 803; see generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
While the Patent Act of 1952 codified 35 U.S.C. § 145, the language of the section that is
being addressed had been in force for over 100 years at the time of being codified in chapter
35, albeit with slight alteration. See Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353 (“[T]he
whole of the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant, whether the final
decision shall be in his favor or otherwise.”).
21
35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“[If after receiving notice of rejection, and] the applicant persists
in [his or her] claim for a patent . . . the patent shall be reexamined.”).
22
Id. § 134.
23
See id. § 141(a) (Federal Circuit appeal); id. § 145 (Eastern District of Virginia civil
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record available for review and the allocation of expenses. In an appeal
before the Federal Circuit, the court is restricted to reviewing only the record
from which the PTAB rendered its decision.24 When proceeding in the
Eastern District of Virginia, because the suit is de novo, the court is not
restricted to the record from which the PTAB rendered its decision; the
patent applicant has the opportunity to introduce evidence that was not
initially considered in the patent application.25 In regard to the allocation of
expenses, the statute that allows an appeal to the Federal Circuit makes no
mention of any such allocation.26 In contrast, the statute that allows a civil
action in the District Court of Virginia establishes that “[a]ll the expenses of
the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”27
The diverging paths of review first took root in the Patent Act of 1836,
delineating between appeals based on denial of a patent, and appeals based
on patent interference.28 Congress established these reviews as a response
to the flood of lawsuits that had found their way into the legal system.29 To
combat this, the Patent Act of 1836 established a Board of Examiners,
appointed by the Secretary of State, to review decisions. The Board was
comprised of “three disinterested persons,” one of whom, if possible, was to
be knowledgeable in the field of the patent in question.30 This enactment
unfortunately did not solve Congress’s concerns for two reasons. First, the
appeals brought to the Board of Examiners took considerably longer and cost
far more than expected, likely as a result of the Commissioner of Patents
construing the Act to allow introduction of further evidence.31 Second, the
compensation provided to those participating on the board of examiners was
action).
24
See id. § 144 (“[T]he Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal
is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.”)
25
See generally id. § 145; Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445–46 (2012) (“[T]here are
no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding
beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”); Folkins v. Watson, 129 F.Supp 362, 365 (D.D.C. 1954) (“The proceeding [is] a
proceeding de novo and [is] not merely a review of the Patent Office proceedings.”), aff’d,
223 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
26
See 35 U.S.C. § 141.
27
Id. § 145.
28
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 §§ 7–8, 5 Stat. 117, 119–21 (establishing an appeal to a
board of examiners based on a denial of a patent by the Commissioner, and an appeal to a
board of examiners based on patent interference).
29
S. DOC. NO. 26-338, at 3 (1836) (explaining that one of the “evils” that Congress
intended to stop was “a great number of lawsuits aris[ing] . . . onerous to the courts . . .
ruinous to the parties . . . and injurious to society”). While this language shows that Congress
did to some extent intend to make civil actions costlier, nothing in the record indicates that
Congress intended to include attorney’s fees as a cost of civil actions.
30
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20.
31
See P.J. Federico, The Patent Office in 1839, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 786, 791 (1939).
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so small that there was difficulty finding people who would agree to serve,
again slowing down the process.32 To alleviate these issues, the
Commissioner made recommendations that would later be adopted in the
Patent Act of 1839. These recommendations included having the Chief
Justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia assess all of the
appeals and bill of equity actions as well as expanding bill of equity actions
so as to be granted in any case of patent refusal.33
The changes instituted by the Patent Act of 1839 are still visible today,
albeit with a slight change in language from “the whole of the expenses” to
“all expenses.”34 This language was altered in 1870 while retaining the
original meaning,35 and was subsequently codified in the Patent Act of
1952.36 Over the course of its existence, the language of the statute has
remained largely unaltered. There is no clear indication of Congress’s
intended meaning of the phrase “the whole of the expenses” or “all of the
expenses” in regard to the Patent Act. The Lanham Act, on the other hand,
has legislative history to support the position that the use of “all the
expenses” in 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) was not intended to include attorney’s
fees.37 The Supreme Court has recognized that in cases where Congress
intended to displace the American Rule through statutory construction,
Congress uses “specific and explicit” language to signify its intention.38
32

Id.
Id. at 791–92; see Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, §§ 10–11, 5 Stat. 353, 354–55. Section
ten of the Patent Act of 1839 extended section sixteen of the Patent Act of 1836 to “all cases
where patents are refused for any reason whatever,” while both sections ten and eleven of the
Patent Act of 1839 modified both appeals and bills of equity actions to be addressed by the
Chief Justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. Section eleven of the
Patent Act of 1839 also established that appeals would be reviewed “on the evidence produced
before the Commissioner.” Id. at 355. This language was not included in section ten. Id. at
354–55. This distinction is still reflected in the application of § 141 and § 145. See supra
notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
34
See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353, 354.
35
An initially proposed version of this section required that “all costs shall be paid by
the complainant, and whole amount of the costs taxed against the complainant shall not exceed
the sum of twenty-five dollars.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4820 (1870). This
language was ultimately struck and replaced with the language “all the expenses of the
proceeding” that is present now. Id.; see Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 52, 16 Stat. 198, 205.
36
The language statute in the prior act was adopted again. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch.
950, § 145, 66 Stat. 792, 803 (“All the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the
applicant.”).
37
See S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). Congress intended a grant of attorney’s fees to
be “limit[ed] . . . to ‘exceptional cases,’” for “acts which courts have characterized as
malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, and willful.” Id. at 5. This intent is visible in other sections
of the Lanham Act, which explicitly reference “attorneys’ fees” as a damages reward for
conduct that may be fairly characterized as “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, and willful.”
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2)(D)(iv), 1116(d)(11), 1117(a), 1117(b).
38
For discussion of Supreme Court precedent regarding fee-shifting statutes that
33
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C. American Rule
The American Rule is the “bedrock principle” when considering
whether to award attorney’s fees: “each litigant pays [his or her] own
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides
otherwise.”39 The American judiciary first articulated this principle in the
1796 case of Arcambel v. Wiseman.40 In a succinct, six-sentence opinion,
the Supreme Court rejected the circuit court’s award of $1600 in counsels’
fees as damages.41 The per curiam opinion explained that “[t]he general
practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court,
till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”42
This opinion was handed down at a time when numerous states had
already enacted statutes allowing for the award of attorney’s fees, adopting
the English Rule of the time.43 The English Rule allowed “costs” recoverable
in an action to include attorney’s fees, creating a “loser pays” system.44
These statutes coincided with considerable hostility towards lawyers, with
some attempts to ban lawyers from practicing within a state.45 State
legislatures that had initially created schedules similar to those created in
England, which established the outer bounds of collectable attorney’s fees,
failed to keep the schedules up-to-date; in effect, the situation devolved into
recoverable costs becoming nominal or nonexistent.46 Despite this, the
displace the American Rule, see infra Part II.D. For further examples of language that the
courts have acknowledged as being sufficiently “specific and explicit,” see infra notes 161–
162 and accompanying text.
39
See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010).
40
3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See A.-H Chroust, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 85-327 (1965);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329
(2013).
44
See generally Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw., c. 1. (directing defendants to pay
costs to successful plaintiffs); see William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 204 (1965). Stoebuck noted that the recovery
of costs dates back as far as the 13th century. Statutes were introduced to regulate costs
recoverable, which created exceptions in certain actions, and court-created schedules were
introduced to establish outer limits to the amount recoverable. These schedules and the
exercise of judicial discretion were the system in which attorney’s fees were awarded in the
past and the present. Id. at 204–05.
45
See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovering Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 11 (1984).
46
See id. at 10 (noting that the New York Legislature fixed the amount recoverable in
dollar amounts instead of a percentage of amount recovered); Stoebuck, supra note 44, at 204,
207; Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
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Arcambel opinion was met with staunch opposition, with states creating
numerous exceptions and extensions to circumvent the Supreme Court’s
holding.47
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court built upon the American Rule,
expanding on the outer limits of the restraint on attorney’s fees awards. It
has allowed the recovery of attorney’s fees in the context of securing trust
funds,48 preserving a common fund,49 and securing a common benefit.50
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that misconduct may allow
for a shift of attorney’s fees,51 as well as the losing party’s bad faith.52
The adoption of the American Rule is rooted in public policy. Chief
Justice Warren explained that the argument has been made that “[s]ince
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be unjustly
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty
for losing included the fees of their opponent’s counsel.”53 Chief Justice
Warren went on to explain that “the time, expense, and difficulties of proof
inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s
fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration.”54 This
opinion underscores the main concerns rooted in the American Rule: access
to the court system, predictability in litigation cost, and the burden on judicial
administration. The American Rule allows plaintiffs who have meritorious
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620 n.7 (1931) (noting that a statute that awarded
attorneys fifteen shilling in 1745 was unchanged for seventy-five years).
47
See Stephen R. Ginger, Attorneys’ Fees Awards to Contract Nonsignatories: Should
Equitable Estoppel Inform the Discretion of the Courts?, 40 GOLDEN STATE U. L. REV. 15, 20
(2009) (noting the reception of the Arcambel decision and the numerous exceptions created
by courts and legislatures alike).
48
See Cowdrey v. Galveston, H. & H. R. Co., 93 U.S. 352, 352, 355 (1877) (allowing
recovery from a trust fund for a party who incurs attorney’s fees preserving or recovering a
fund of another).
49
See Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537 (1882) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees
for a party who incurs legal fees protecting or collecting the fund).
50
See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166–67 (1939) (allowing recovery
of attorney’s fees by a successful litigant where the litigation provides a substantial benefit on
a class of persons).
51
See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427–28 (1923) (allowing
recovery of attorney’s fees against a party who has been found in contempt of court, causing
further litigation expense to correct the contempt).
52
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 2, 5 (1973) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees against
a losing party who act in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
(citation omitted)). For further discussion of the exceptions recognized by the courts to the
American Rule, see John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578–90 (1993).
53
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1976).
54
Id.
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claims to litigate them in the judicial system by foreclosing the possibility of
being saddled with their adversary’s often considerable attorney’s fees.55
The American Rule also avoids the added expense of having to litigate the
award of attorney’s fees. The determination of reasonable attorney’s fees
has evolved with time, from a percentage-based calculation to a factor-based
test, and the calculation is not always as clean as parties would hope.56
D. Statutory Construction and Supreme Court Precedent
Congress has the ability to displace the American Rule with proper
statutory language. The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of
language that displace the American Rule and has developed two lines of
precedent regarding each one, with the two requiring different types of
clarity and use of language. The first is the “prevailing party” precedent,
best displayed in Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean57 and Baker Botts v.
ASARCO.58 The second is the “non-prevailing party” precedent, best
displayed by Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company59 and
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.60
1. “Prevailing Party” Precedent
The Court in Baker Botts explained that the best example of “prevailing
party” requirement can be found in the Court’s prior interpretation of the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean.61 In
Jean, the Court addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)62 allowed for
deviation from the American Rule.63 This EAJA statute uses the terms
“prevailing party,” “fees,” and “civil action” to establish its intent to displace
the American Rule.64 The Court in Jean held that this language sufficiently

55
See Walter Olsen & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161,
1188 (noting that concerns over paying large legal fees upon losing a case hurts the middle
class both when they sue and when they get sued).
56
See generally Michael Kao, Calculating Lawyers’ Fees: Theory and Reality, 51
UCLA L. Rev. 825, 829–33 (2004).
57
496 U.S. 154 (1990).
58
135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
59
560 U.S. 242 (2010).
60
463 U.S. 680 (1983).
61
Baker Botts, 135 S.Ct. at 2164.
62
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2018) (“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), . . . .”).
63
Jean, 496 U.S. at 156–57 (1990) (addressing recovery of attorney’s fees in response
to litigation about fees).
64
It was the intent of Congress to “insure the applicability . . . of the common law and
statutory exceptions to the ‘American Rule’ respecting attorney fees.” Id. at 163 n.11.
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allows for the awarding of fees from “all aspects of the civil action,” which
includes attorney’s fees.65 The Court subsequently in Baker Botts explained
that what it required was a statute that includes the terms “fees,” a “prevailing
party,” and “civil action” to displace the American Rule.66 Utilizing this
framework again, the Court in Baker Botts rejected the claim that 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1) allowed for an award of attorney’s fees.67 The language
“reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” used in
the statute “neither specifically nor explicitly authorizes courts to shift the
costs” of attorney’s fees in contravention of the American Rule.68 The Court
makes clear that for a “prevailing party” statute to displace the American
Rule, it must include language such as “fees,” “prevailing party,”
“successful,” and “civil action.”69 An example of such language can be
found in 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), a provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which requires that “[a]n agency that conducts an adversary
adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States,
fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that
proceeding.”70 This language comports with the “prevailing party”
precedent requirements, and allows for the shifting of attorney’s fees.
2. “Non-Prevailing Party” Precedent
In “non-prevailing party” precedent, the Court again looks for “specific
and explicit” language, but in a different form. In Hardt, the Court addressed
whether 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) allowed the award of attorneys’ fees only to
the prevailing party.71 While the statute does not provide a “prevailing party”
requirement, the Court acknowledged that there are “deviations from the
American Rule that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to the ‘prevailing
party.’”72 The Hardt Court cited Ruckelshaus as the principal case regarding
“non-prevailing party” precedent.73 The Ruckelshaus Court addressed
whether it was appropriate for the lower courts to award attorney’s fees
65

Id. at 161.
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164.
67
Id. at 2165; see 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2018) (allowing “reasonable compen-sation
for actual, necessary services rendered” by [those assisting in the representation of an estate,
including] attorney[s]”).
68
Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165.
69
Id. at 2164; see Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (noting
“successful” as a phrase often found in prevailing party fee-shifting statutes).
70
See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
71
Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251–52 (2010); see 29 U.S.C. §
1132(g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of action to either party.”).
72
Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254.
73
Id.
66
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f),74 despite the lack of a success requirement.75
The Court held that while the statute in question did not have a “prevailing
party” requirement, it was still sufficient to allow an award of attorney’s
fees.76 While the Court does not require any particular magic words to shift
fees, there still needs to be some language that is “specific and explicit” that
the Court may point to as evidence that it was truly Congress’s intention to
shift fees from one party to another.77 An example of such a situation can be
found in 2 U.S.C. § 396, a statute dealing with contested elections in
Congress, which allows for “reimbursement . . . of his reasonable expenses
of the contested election case, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”78
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the American Rule is the default approach to awarding attorney’s
fees, it can be displaced by statute.79 The language that is required to displace
the American Rule through statute usually “contain[s] language that
authorizes the award of ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee,’ ‘fees,’ or ‘litigation
costs.’”80 The circuit split detailed below attempts to address whether the
statutory language in question meets the “specific and explicit” requirement
for displacement of the American Rule.
In 2015, the Fourth Circuit in Shammas v. Focarino81 was tasked with
interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) to determine whether the statute allowed
for the recovery of attorney’s fees in a trademark application civil action
based on the language “all expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the

74

42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2018) (“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”).
75
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983).
76
Id. at 682 (allowing an award of attorney’s fees despite § 7607(f) not articulating a
prevailing party requirement).
77
See Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717,
721–22 (1982); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) (“The
absence of [a] specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise
evinces an intent to provide for such fees.”). For further discussion of Key Tronic and its
consideration of Congressional intent by examining the full statutory construction, see infra
notes 180–186.
78
See 2 U.S.C. § 396 (2018) (emphasis added).
79
See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO,
LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (“Because [the American Rule] is deeply rooted in the
common law, this Court will not deviate from it ‘absent explicit statutory language.’”
(citations omitted)); see generally John F. Vargo, supra note 52, at 1568–88 (noting there are
more than two hundred federal statutes and almost 2,000 state statutes providing attorney
fees).
80
See generally Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010).
81
784 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2015).
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party bringing the case.”82 After analyzing the language and structure of the
statute, the court held that it indeed allowed for the recovery of attorney’s
fees.83
Five years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu was similarly tasked with interpreting a nearidentical phrase in 35 U.S.C. § 145 concerning the recovery of attorney’s
fees in a patent application civil action.84 After criticism of the Shammas
court’s analysis of § 1071(b)(3),85 the Nantkwest court held that the language
and structure of the statute did not allow for recovery of attorney’s fees.86
Because of the near-identical language of the statutes in question, there is
now a circuit split as to whether attorney’s fees can be recovered in de novo
trademark and patent application civil actions.87
A. Shammas v. Focarino
1. Facts of the Case
Plaintiff Milo Shammas was the owner of a gardening supply company,
Dr. Earth, Inc.88 Shammas filed a trademark application for the mark
“PROBIOTIC” which was to be used in conjunction with Dr. Earth fertilizer
products.89 The USPTO attorney assigned to Shammas’s application denied
it on two grounds: the word “probiotic” was a generic term for particular
types of soil additives and fertilizers, and even if the term “probiotic” was
descriptive of the product, it did not have a secondary meaning.90 Shammas
appealed this decision by the USPTO attorney to the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (“TTAB”), who affirmed the decision of the USPTO
attorney.91 The Lanham Act provides two options for review: an appeal to
the Federal Circuit, or a de novo civil action in the district court.92 Shammas
82

Id. at 222.
Id. at 227.
84
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019 (No. 18-801).
85
Id. at 1185 (“We respectfully submit that Shammas’s holding cannot be squared with
the Supreme Court’s line of non-prevailing party precedent applying the American Rule.”).
86
Id. at 1196.
87
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2018) (“[A]ll the expenses of the proceeding shall
be paid by the party bringing the case[.]”), with 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2018) (“All the expenses of
the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”).
88
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221.
89
Id.
90
Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015) (No.
14-1191), 2016 WL 7406019, at *4.
91
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221.
92
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (“An applicant for registration of a mark . . . who is
dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or [TTAB], may appeal to the United States
83
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filed for review in the district court, and the district court granted the
USPTO’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that Shammas “had
failed to cast doubt on the finding that ‘PROBIOTIC’ was a generic term.”93
The USPTO then filed a motion to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred
as a result of the proceeding, pursuant to § 1071(b)(3).94 These expenses
totaled $35,926.59, which included the combined expenses of two USPTO
attorneys’ prorated salaries, and one paralegal.95 Shammas opposed the
awarding of the attorneys’ and paralegal’s prorated salaries, arguing that §
1071(b)(3) did not explicitly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees that
is required to displace the American Rule.96 The district court affirmed the
reimbursement of the prorated salaries of the two attorneys and the paralegal,
stating, “the plain meaning of the term ‘expenses,’ by itself, would clearly
seem to include attorney’s fees. But if any doubt remained, it is removed by
Congress’s addition of the word ‘all’ to clarify the breadth of the term
‘expenses.’”97 By adding this modifier, Congress made clear that it intended
that the plaintiff in such an action pay for all the resources expended by the
USPTO during litigation, including attorney’s fees.”98 Shammas appealed
the court order requiring that he pay the prorated attorneys’ and paralegal’s
fees.99
2. The Shammas Court’s Analysis
The Fourth Circuit began by addressing Shammas’s concern that
because Congress did not expressly authorize attorney-fee-shifting in §
1071(b)(3), “a district court may not read a federal statute to authorize” such

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”); id. § 1071(b)(1) (“Whenever a person
authorized by subsection (a) of this section to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and is dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or [TTAB], said
person may, [unless a 1071(a)(1) appeal has commenced], have a remedy by a civil
action . . . .”). The structure of the appeal and civil action process in the Lanham Act is the
same as the process in the Patent Act of 1952. See 35 U.S.C. § 141; id. § 145.
93
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221.
94
Id. at 221–222; 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (b)(3) (“[U]nless the court finds the expenses to be
unreasonable, all the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the party bringing the case,
whether the final decision is in favor of such party or not.” (emphasis added)).
95
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222. Of the $36,320.49 awarded, $32,836.27 was awarded for
the prorated salaries of the attorneys, and $3,090.32 was awarded for the salary of the
paralegal. This was calculated by dividing the employees’ annual salaries by 2000 and
multiplying by the total hours expended defending the action. The USPTO also included
$393.90 in photocopying expenses. Id.
96
Id.
97
Shammas v. Focarino, 990 F.Supp.2d 587, 591 (E.D. Va. 2014).
98
Id.
99
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222.
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fee-shifting and displace the American Rule.100 The Fourth Circuit seized
on Shammas’s acknowledgement that the term “expenses” is broad enough
to encompass attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees.101 Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit drew attention to the modifier “all” that precedes “expenses” within
the statute to show that, even within a common meaning of “expenses,”
Congress did not intend for it to be limited.102 Further, citing Wisconsin v.
Hotline Indus., Inc.,103 the Fourth Circuit established that although the
USPTO attorneys are in salaried positions, their being diverted from other
work within the USPTO is an expense that is incurred by the USPTO.104
Having dealt with the issue of what the phrase “all expenses” includes,
what is left of Shammas’s argument is whether § 1071(b)(3) sufficiently and
explicitly shifts attorney’s fees in a way that overcomes the American Rule’s
presumption that attorney’s fees are not included.105 The Fourth Circuit
began its analysis of Shammas’s argument by stating that his assumption that
the American Rule applied was “misplaced under the circumstances.”106
Close inspection of the American Rule, the court explained, shows that its
intention is to prevent the prevailing party from recovering attorney’s fees
from the losing party.107 This purpose ties into the “express authorization”
that Shammas argued is required of Congress to create a fee-shifting statute.
The Fourth Circuit drew attention to the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Ruckelshaus explaining that when Congress has decided to depart from the
American Rule, “virtually every one of the more than 150 existing federal
fee-shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some success by the
claimant . . . the consistent rule is that complete failure will not justify
shifting fees.”108 Based on this language, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
the “specific and explicit” language required to overcome the American Rule
is only required when it is meant to prevent the prevailing party from

100

Id.
Id.
102
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1).
103
236 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000)
104
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223; see Hotline Indus., Inc., 236 F.3d at 365 (“[S]alaried
government lawyers . . . do incur expenses if the time and resources they devote to one case
are not available for other work.”).
105
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223.
106
Id.
107
Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)
(“[T]he prevailing party may not recover attorneys’ fees as costs or otherwise.”) (emphasis
added); see also, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (“[T]he prevailing party is not entitled to collect [attorney’s
fees] from the loser.”).
108
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223 (emphasis in original); for discussion of Ruckelshaus, see
supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
101
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recovering attorney’s fees; because § 1071(b)(3) has no prevailing party
requirement, the American Rule is not implicated, and no specific and
explicit language is required.109
In contrast, § 1071(b)(3) requires that “all the expenses of the
proceeding shall be paid by the party bringing the case, whether the final
decision is in the favor of such party or not.”110 With that, the Fourth Circuit
found that § 1071(b)(3) is not a statute that stands within the context of the
American Rule, and does not require the “express authorization” that
Shammas argued is required to establish fee-shifting.111 Analyzing the plain
language of § 1071(b)(3), the Fourth Circuit held that in a de novo district
court proceeding, the expenses include attorney’s fees, regardless of
success.112
The Fourth Circuit then turned to an alternative argument advanced by
Shammas: that “expenses of the proceeding” within the context of the statute
should be interpreted as aligning with the meaning of “costs of the
proceeding,” which only includes taxable costs.113 In adopting the “costs of
the proceeding” interpretation, taxable costs would not include attorney’s
fees.114 The Fourth Circuit quickly disposed of this argument based on
Shammas’s failure to offer an explanation as to why the court should adopt
this view, and based on the court’s previous rulings.115 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit explained that, in applying the “cardinal principle of statutory
construction,” Congress did not intend for “expenses” to be interchangeable
with “costs” within § 1071(b)(3).116
The Fourth Circuit continues by analyzing both the statutory scheme
and the legislative history of the Lanham Act.117 First, the Fourth Circuit
explains that because an action under
§ 1071(b)(1) is a de novo civil action, it is a more extensive and
expensive action for the USPTO than an appeal under § 1071(a)(1).118 By
requiring the trademark applicant to pay “all the expenses of the proceeding,”

109

Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3) (emphasis added).
111
See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223–24.
112
Id. at 224.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.; see Robertson v. Cooper, 46 F.2d 766, 769 (4th Cir. 1931) (allowing recovery of
a government attorney’s expenses related to attending depositions).
116
See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 224; TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[A]
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that . . . no clause, sentence, or word shall
be superfluous.”) (citation omitted).
117
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 225.
118
Id.
110
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regardless of success, Congress intended to alleviate the burden on the
USPTO having to defend its findings.119 Additionally, in examining the
breakdown of the USPTO’s expenses incurred in the proceeding, 98% are
attributable to attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees.120 To not allow for the
recovery of 98% of the expenses incurred would be anomalous, especially
considering the availability of an alternative avenue of appeal under §
1071(a)(1).121 Second, in examining the legislative history of the Lanham
Act, the Fourth Circuit explained that § 1071(b)(3) was “intended as a
straightforward funding provision, designed to relieve the USPTO of the
financial burden that results from an applicant’s election to pursue more
expensive district court litigation.”122 The language of § 1071(b)(3) was
adopted from a parallel provision of the Patent Act, which established “a
fund for the payment of the salaries of the officers and clerks . . . and all other
expenses of the [USPTO].”123 The Patent Act additionally differentiated
between the terms “expense” and “cost.”124 The Lanham Act’s passage
“[incorporated] the procedures for appellate review of patent application
denials in trademark proceedings.”125 With this, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that when a trademark application denial is appealed under §
1071(b)(1), “all of the expenses” under § 1071(b)(3) include the prorated
salaries of the USPTO attorneys and paralegals who worked on the defense
of the decision.126
B. Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu
1. Facts of the Case
In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application for a cancer
treatment that utilized natural cells to kill cancer cells.127 Dr. Klingemann’s
patent application was assigned to Nantkwest, and the application was
119

Id.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 226.
123
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 226 (citing Act of July, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121).
124
Compare Act of July, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (“[A]nd all other expenses
of the [USPTO]”) (emphasis added), with id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123 (“[T]o adjudge and award as
to costs, as may appear just and equitable.”) (emphasis added).
125
Shammas, 784 F.3d at 226 (citing S. REP. NO. 87-2107, at 7 (1962)). The Lanham Act
initially cross-referenced the procedures for review in the Patent Act, but was later amended
to remove the cross-reference and “incorporate, with necessary changes in language, the
various provisions of [35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.] relating to such appeals and review.” S. REP.
NO. 87-2107, at 7 (1962).
126
Id. at 227.
127
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801).
120
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rejected in 2010 for being “obvious.”128 The PTO Board affirmed the
rejection of Nantkwest’s patent in 2013, resulting in Nantkwest’s civil action
under § 145.129 At the close of discovery, the USPTO moved for, and was
granted, summary judgment.130 The USPTO then filed a motion for
reimbursement in accordance with § 145, which totaled $111,696.39, and
included $78,592.50 in attorneys’ fees.131 The court denied the motion,
citing the American Rule. The district court explained its reasoning as being
grounded in the Baker Botts standard, which § 145 does not overcome in a
manner sufficient to fee-shift within the American Rule.132 The USPTO
appealed the denial of the motion, and a Federal Circuit panel reversed.133
The panel relied heavily on the Shammas opinion.134 The Federal Circuit
voted sua sponte to hear the appeal en banc, focusing on the question of
whether the language “all the expenses of the proceedings” allows for an
award of attorney’s fees.135
2. The Nantkwest Court’s Analysis
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit held that the American Rule
applies to § 145,136 explaining that the American Rule is the “starting point”
for any party or statute that attempts to shift the cost of attorney’s fees to the
other party.137 The USPTO relied on the Shammas opinion for the position
that that the American Rule should not apply to § 145, which the Federal
Circuit found unpersuasive.138 The Federal Circuit was skeptical of the
Fourth Circuit’s view that the American Rule does not apply, relying on
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society,139 which states that
“the American Rule provides only that ‘the prevailing party may not recover
attorneys’ fees from the losing party.’”140 The Federal Circuit drew attention
128

Id.
Id.
130
Id.; see Nantkwest v. Lee, 686 F. App’x 864, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming).
131
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. Attorney’s fees were calculated in a similar fashion to
the calculation in Shammas—prorated salaries of two USPTO attorneys’ and one paralegal.
132
Id.; see Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2010) (with
some variation, a majority of statutes that authorize fee-shifting within the American Rule
include language such as “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” “fees,” or “litigation costs”).
133
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1183.
134
Id. For discussion of the Shammas opinion, see supra Part III.A.
135
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184; see Nantkwest v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(vacating panel ruling and reinstating appeal sua sponte).
136
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184.
137
Id.; see Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164 (“Our basic point of reference when considering
the award of attorney’s fees is . . . the American Rule.”).
138
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184.
139
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
140
Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline,
129
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to the fact that Alyeska Pipeline’s rule is not strictly predicated on the
language of the “prevailing party.”141 The Federal Circuit found that the
Hardt Court’s definition of the American Rule was more relevant to the
question of whether the American Rule was applicable to § 145.142 In Hardt,
the Federal Circuit analyzed whether the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
allowed the award of attorney’s fees only to the prevailing party.143 The
Court found that the absence of reference to a prevailing party within the text
did not displace the American Rule from a fee-shifting inquiry, and instead
held that “statutory deviations from the American Rule [do not] limit
attorney’s fees awards to the ‘prevailing party.’”144
The Federal Circuit next turned to the Fourth Circuit’s application of
Ruckelshaus.145 Although the Ruckelshaus Court recognized that a number
of fee-shifting provisions include some “success” requirement, the court also
recognized that a lack of a “success” requirement does not mean that the
American Rule is inapplicable. Instead, the court held that despite the fact
that the statue in question did not have such a requirement, the American
Rule still applied.146 Additionally, the Nantkwest court noted that the
Supreme Court has applied the American Rule to statutes that do not specify
a “success” requirement on multiple occasions.147 In an attempt to bolster
its position, the USPTO cited Sebelius v. Cloer,148 which interpreted a statute
requiring the payment of attorney’s fees whether or not the party succeeded
without discussing the American Rule.149 The Federal Circuit quickly
distinguished this case, and explained that Cloer “[stood] for the
unremarkable principle that a statute providing for an award of attorney’s
fees can displace the American Rule.”150
421 U.S. at 245) (emphasis in original).
141
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185.
142
See id.
143
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251–52 (2010); see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of action to either party.”).
144
Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254.
145
For the Shammas court’s application of Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680
(1983), see supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
146
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185; see Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682–84.
147
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185–86 (citing Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S.
Ct. 2158, 2165 (2015) (bankruptcy statute); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809,
819 (1994) (environmental statute); Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 722 (1982) (unfair labor practice statute)).
148
569 U.S. 369 (2013).
149
See id. at 379 (explaining that the Court’s examination in a statutory construction case
ends when the “statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent”).
150
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1186; see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2018) (“In awarding
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After resolving the question of whether the American Rule applied to §
145 in the affirmative, the Federal Circuit next addressed whether the
language of § 145 overrides the American Rule.151 It is first noted that the
Supreme Court has explained that when a statutory provision does not
“expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees,” Congress has not
created a situation where awarding such attorney’s fees is permissible.152
This does not foreclose the possibility that Congress’s intent can be read into
the statute from a lack of express language, as Congress can convey such
intent through choices in statutory language.153 These statutory language
choices must, nonetheless, convey a “specific and explicit” instruction to
displace the American Rule.154 Next, the Federal Circuit noted that § 145
does not evince the “specific and explicit” authorization by Congress to
depart from the American Rule.155 The language in § 145 is “at best
ambiguous,” and the court declined to read intent into language that does not
convey some sort of explicit direction regarding fee-shifting.156 The Federal
Circuit countered the USPTO’s dictionary definition of “expense”157 with
the definition of “expense” from other dictionaries in the same time period158
to show that it is ineffective to rely on vague and varied definitions to attempt
to establish an “implicit authorization to award attorney’s fees.”159
Rather than relying on dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit

compensation on a petition filed [under this section] the special master or court shall also
award as part of such compensation an amount to cover reasonable attorneys’ fees[.]”)
(emphasis added).
151
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1186.
152
See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722 (internal citations omitted); Key Tronic, 511 U.S.
at 815.
153
See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722–23; see also Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 815 (“The
absence of [a] specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise
evinces an intent to provide for such fees.”).
154
Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2161 (2015). See also Summit
Valley, 456 U.S. at 726 (applying the American Rule after finding no “express statutory
authorization” in the statute’s language to support the position that “damages” includes
attorney’s fees); Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819 (requiring “explicit statutory authority” to depart
from the American Rule).
155
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1187.
156
Id.
157
Expense, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828) (“[A]
laying out or expending; the disbursing of money, or the employment and consumption, as of
time or labor.”)
158
Expense, A COMPREHENSIVE PRONOUNCING AND EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, WITH PRONOUNCING VOCABULARIES OF CLASSICAL AND SCRIPTURE
PROPER NAMES (1830) (“[C]ost; charges; money expended.”); Expense, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Joseph Worcester ed., 1830) (“Money expended,”
“cost,” and “[t]hat which is used, employed, laid out or consumed.”).
159
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722).
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examined the use of “expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” in other statutes,
which, the court explained, shows that “[Congress understood] that the
ordinary meaning of ‘expenses’ does not include attorneys’ fees.”160 Two
categories of statutory drafting were recognized, the first being statutes that
award both “expenses” and “attorneys’ fees,”161 and the second being
statutes that explicitly define “expenses” to include “attorneys’ fees.”162 The
language of § 145 does not fall into either of these categories. The court then
considered the language of § 145 within the context of related statutes,
examining whether “attorneys’ fees” had been awarded separate, or in
conjunction with “expenses.”163 The Patent Act contains sections that either
award attorney’s fees, or cross-reference to a section that awards attorney’s
fees, such as § 285, which allows the court to award attorney’s fees in
“exceptional cases.”164 This section not only allows an award of attorney’s
fees, but is cross-referenced in other sections of the Patent Act.165 By
omitting “attorneys’ fees” from its statutory language, § 145 “strongly

160

Id. at 1188.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §363(n) (2018) (“[A]ny costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses
incurred”); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(b)(vii) (2018)(“[R]easonable expenses and attorneys’
fees”); 12 U.S.C. § 1786(p) (same); 25 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2018) (“[A]ttorney fees and
litigation expenses”); id. § 6673(a)(2)(A) (“excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees”); 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (2018) (defining the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses awardable);
38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(2) (2018) (“[R]easonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other
litigation expenses”); Use of “expenses” to include attorney’s fees, despite intentionally
creating the distinction between the two within these statutes, would be “an inexplicable
exercise in redundancy.” W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991).
162
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(2)(B) (2018) (“[E]xpenses (including costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses of representation).”); 10 U.S.C. § 2409(c)(1)(C)
(2018) (“[A]ggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees and expert
witnesses’ fees).”); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (“[A]ggregate amount of cost and expenses
(including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended).”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2018)
(“[J]ust costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees . . . .”); 29 U.S.C § 1370(e)(1)
(2018) (“[T]he costs and expenses incurred in connection with such action, including
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”); 30 U.S.C. § 938(c) (2018) (“[A] sum equal to the aggregate
amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney’s fees) . . . .”); 41 U.S.C. § 4705(d)(1)(C)
(2018) (“[A]n amount equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including
attorney’s fees . . .).”); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(9) (2018) (“[R]easonable expenses
incurred . . . including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”); 2 U.S.C. § 396 (“[R]easonable expenses
of the contested election case, including reasonable attorneys fees . . . .”). Use of “attorneys’
fee” as an explanatory term that modifies “expense” shows that “Congress viewed [the terms
“expense” and “attorneys’ fees”] as distinct tools in its toolbox of recovery items,” and courts
should avoid interpreting statutes in a way that creates redundancy. Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at
1189.
163
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1189–90.
164
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”) (emphasis added); id. § 297(b)(1) (“[R]easonable costs
and attorneys’ fees[.]”) (emphasis added).
165
Id. § 271(e)(4) (cross-referencing § 285); id. § 273(f) (cross-referencing § 285).
161
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suggest[s] a deliberate decision not to authorize such awards.”166 The court
also considered past judicial use of the term “expenses,” noting that it “does
not ordinarily include attorney’s fees.”167
IV. THE BEST APPROACH—ATTORNEYS’ FEES NOT INCLUDED
A. The Shammas Court’s Application of the American Rule is
Wrong
The Shammas court relies on a faulty concept of what the American
Rule is and how it functions. In Shammas, the court relies on Alyeska
Pipeline’s articulation of the American Rule, stating that “‘the prevailing
party may not recover attorneys’ fees’ from the losing party.”168 The
Shammas court uses this definition to explain that, because § 1071(b)(3) does
not have a prevailing party requirement in its text, it does not implicate the
American Rule whatsoever. As a result, the statute need not use specific and
explicit language to shift attorney’s fees.169 The lack of reference to a
prevailing party in no way means that the American Rule is not implicated;
the American Rule is implicated wherever a statute purports to shift
attorneys’ fees from one party to another.170
The Hardt Court accurately defined the American Rule as the default
under which “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless
a statute or contract provides otherwise.”171 This is the definition that the
Nantkwest court relied upon.172 By even considering the possibility that “all
expenses” in both § 1071(b)(3) and § 145 would allow for recovery of
attorney’s fees, the statute necessarily implicates the American Rule, as the
statute would be attempting to have one litigant pay another litigant’s
166
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1190 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809,
819 (1994) (declining to award attorney’s fees where the relevant section did not utilize
explicit language to shift fees, while other sections of the statutory scheme used express
language to shift fees)).
167
Id. at 1191 (quoting Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., Div. of Econ. & Med. Servs. V.
Kistler, 320 Ark. 501, 509 (1995)).
168
Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)). While the court was quick to reach for
Black’s Law Dictionary to define “expenses,” it declined to consider Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of the American Rule, which more accurately aligns with the
Nantkwest and Baker Botts courts, among others. American Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“The general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their
own attorney’s fees. The rule is subject to bad-faith and other statutory and contractual
exceptions.”).
169
See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223–24.
170
See supra Part II.D.
171
Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010); see supra note 168.
172
Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184.
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attorney’s fees. In this context, neither of the statutes provide the specific
and explicit statutory language that would be required to displace the
American Rule.
B. Granting USPTO Attorney’s Fees is Contrary to the
Principles of the American Rule
The Nantkwest court’s application of the American Rule to § 145 and
its finding that the statutory language is not “explicit and sufficient” to
displace the American Rule demonstrates that the rule remains a “bedrock
principle” applicable to all statutes.173 The Shammas court relied on a narrow
reading of Alyeska Pipeline to support the idea that the American Rule
applies only to shifting fees from the prevailing party to the losing party.174
In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court focused on the connection between the
American Rule and the prevailing party simply because the appeal in
question dealt with an award of attorney’s fees to a party who prevailed in
the court below. In the Court’s view, the prevailing party was “performing
the services of a ‘private attorney general.’”175 But the Court was not making
a broad proclamation defining how the American Rule is supposed to
function. Instead, it was correcting an improper application of an exception
to the American Rule by the court below.176 The Court has defined the
American Rule as a default under which “each litigant pays [their] own
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides
otherwise.”177 There is no requirement of either a winning or a losing party
within this definition; all that is established is that when one party is paying
the attorney’s fees of another party, a fee is being shifted, and the American
Rule has been implicated.
The Shammas court’s interpretation of the American Rule contravenes
Chief Justice Warren’s three aims in Fleischmann: access, predictability, and

173

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222–23.
175
See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 241 (1975). The
exception applied by the Supreme Court, known as the private attorney general doctrine,
provides courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees to “a party who vindicates a right that
(1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal
importance.” See Carl Cheng, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (1985). This exception allows for the enforcement of public
rights through private lawsuits. Id. at 1929 n.1.
176
See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 246 (internal citations omitted) (“The Court of
Appeals [after finding other American Rule exceptions inapplicable] held that the [prevailing
party] had acted to vindicate “important statutory rights of all citizens . . . .”
177
See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010). For discussion
of the exceptions to the American Rule, see supra Part II.C.
174

ESPOSITO (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

10/3/2019 7:03 PM

COMMENT

229

judicial administration.178 The Shammas court’s determination that the
American Rule does not apply to § 1071(b)(3) offends all three aims. Parties
bringing civil actions are aware of the costs expected of them at the outset,
but the inclusion of attorney’s fees adds a level of uncertainty that would
dissuade meritorious trademark reexamination claims, not promote access to
courts. This is especially concerning when the attorney’s fees purported to
be saved by the USPTO are infinitesimally small in comparison to the
increased cost that would be shouldered by trademark applicants should the
USPTO spread the burden.179 The decision to award attorney’s fees
impinges on the ability of the applicant seeking reexamination to adequately
prepare for the cost of litigation as a whole, and make informed decisions
based on that information. The Shammas court instead placed more burdens
on applicants, who are left to wonder how much time and how many
attorneys and paralegals will be assigned to review the reexamination. An
applicant cannot reasonably anticipate the total cost of the USPTO’s
attorney’s fees.
The Nantkwest court properly applied the American Rule to its analysis
of § 145, which includes the same “all expenses” language found in §
1071(b)(3) that the Shammas court analyzed. These statutes must be viewed
in the context of the American Rule, and must be analyzed to determine
whether there is reason to fee-shift that is explicitly and specifically stated
by Congress.180 It is clear that none of the exceptions to the American Rule
apply to either § 145 or § 1071(b)(3), as they are not securing any trust fund,
common fund, or common benefit.181 Additionally, neither case involved
misconduct or bad faith of the losing party.182 The only possible avenue to
shifting attorney’s fees in both these cases is through “explicit and sufficient”
statutory intent.183 In a vacuum, the Shammas court’s analysis of §
1071(b)(3) may have been persuasive.
The generally understood
connotation of “all expenses” could include attorney’s fees as a reward, and
those attorney’s fees could be considered a part of the proceeding. But when
Congress utilizes vague statutory language that could be generally
understood to include attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court regularly declines
to interpret such language as a catch-all.184 Interpreting vague statutory
178

See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219, 221 and accompanying text.
180
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801).
181
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
182
See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
183
See Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2161 (2010).
184
See, e.g., Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S.
717, 721–22, 726 (1982) (rejecting 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)’s language of “shall recover the
179
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language as sufficient to meet a “specific and explicit” requirement is
inherently untenable. The Shammas court sidestepped the requisite statutory
construction for fee-shifting, reaching its own conclusion based solely on a
“plain meaning” interpretation.185 By contrast, the Nantkwest court properly
recognized that a “plain meaning” interpretation would be untenable since
Congress has provided an extensive list of statutory references from which
the meaning of “explicit and sufficient” can be derived.186
C. Not Granting Attorney’s Fees Respects Congress’s Intent
The Shammas court found that the American Rule does not apply to §
1071(b)(3) because it does not refer to a “prevailing party” and contains
language that could plausibly encompass attorney’s fees.187 While the
majority cites tenuous supporting precedent,188 its failure to recognize the
construction of the statute as a whole led the court astray. In Key Tronic, the
Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)189 to
determine whether it provides for the awarding of attorney’s fees.190 The
statute allows for the recovery of “any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan.”191 The Court concluded that because other sections in the chapter
allow attorney’s fees awards192 while § 9607(a)(4)(B) does not, it would be
inappropriate to presume that Congress intended to allow such recovery. 193
The Court rested its decision on the principle that when Congress uses
language in one section of a statute but does not include it in another, it is
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit” as insufficiently specific and explicit); Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994) (rejecting 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B)’s language of “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person” as insufficiently specific and explicit).
185
The plain meaning rule applied by the Shammas court is anything but plain. For
further discussion, see generally William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 546–50 (2017); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing
the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229,
236–41 (2004).
186
See generally supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
187
Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223, 227 (4th Cir. 2015).
188
Id. at 223 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975),
and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983)).
189
The Court refers to this statute as CERCLA § 107, but for clarity, the full citation of
the statute will be used. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2018).
190
See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994).
191
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
192
See id. § 9606(b)(2)(E) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), which defines “fees
and other expenses” to include attorney’s fees); id. § 9659(f) (“The court . . . may award costs
of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing
[party.]”).
193
See Key Tronic, 551 U.S. at 818–19.
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presumed to be purposeful.194
The Shammas court made no reference to the numerous statutory
provisions within the Lanham Act that specifically and explicitly allow for
the recovery of attorney’s fees when considering § 1071(b)(3). Within the
Lanham Act, Congress created multiple sections that allow for the recovery
of attorney’s fees, such as § 1116(d)(11),195 and §§ 1117(a) and (b),196 among
others.197 Further, these sections conform with Congress’s intent to allow
for the recovery of attorney’s fees only in “exceptional cases” where there
have been “acts which courts have characterized as malicious, fraudulent,
deliberate, or willful.”198 The language used in these sections are sufficiently
specific and explicit to overcome the American Rule, falling under the
Nantkwest court’s first category of statutory drafting,199 while the language
in § 1071(b)(3) is not. If the Shammas court had considered the existence of
these sections of the Lanham Act, the court would have been hard pressed to
wave away the fact that Congress had made clear when and under what
circumstances it wanted to displace the American Rule. The statutory
construction of the Lanham Act makes clear that § 1071(b)(3) was purposely
excluded from being a part of such distinction.
The Nantkwest court considered Key Tronic in its analysis of § 145, and
examined the larger statutory construction before concluding that § 145 does
not allow attorney’s fees.200 Because of the existence of sections that either
explicitly allowed attorney’s fees, or cross-referenced sections that did allow
attorney’s fees, it would be near impossible to say that, despite specific and
explicit language in other portions of the statutory construction, Congress
still intended to include attorney’s fees by simply stating “all costs.”201
194

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”) (citation omitted).
195
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2018) (authorizing recovery of a “reasonable attorney’s
fee”).
196
Id. § 1117(a) (authorizing recovery of “reasonable attorney fees”); id. § 1117(b)
(authorizing recovery of “reasonable attorney fee[s]”).
197
See, e.g., id. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) (authorizing recovery to include “costs and attorney’s
fees”); id. § 1122(c) (authorizing recovery of “damages, profits, costs and attorney’s fees”).
198
See S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974).
199
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
200
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert.
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Key
Tronic found it persuasive that Congress included express provisions for fee awards in related
statutes without including a similar provision in the statute at issue.”).
201
See supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text. This is further bolstered by the fact
that § 285 is cross-referenced by several sections in relation to patent litigation, but Congress
explicitly chose not to include such cross-reference in § 145. In a similar vein, it is unlikely
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Congress could have either included the language found within these
sections elsewhere to denote allowable fee-shifting, or cross-referenced to §
285, but it chose neither. The Nantkwest court properly held that § 145 is
insufficiently specific and explicit to shift attorney’s fees in light of these
considerations. This holding is in line with precedent that properly ascertains
Congress’s intent based on the entirety of the statutory scheme instead of
failing to see the forest for the trees.
D. USPTO Has Recently Attempted to Restrict § 145 Actions
The USPTO’s attempt to recover attorney’s fees is a continuation of its
attempt to hinder access to § 145 civil actions. Not only this, the attempted
interference is in contravention of Congress’s intent, as explained above,202
and should be rejected until the time that Congress determines that displacing
the American Rule in trademark and patent application civil actions is
appropriate.
In Kappos v. Hyatt,203 the USPTO attempted to restrict the evidentiary
record of the district court in a § 145 action to what was reviewed by the
PTAB.204 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected the
USPTO’s argument and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that Congress
intended applicants to be able to introduce new evidence in a § 145 civil
action so long as it does not violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Evidence.205 It is noted that, while judicial review of an
agency decision is commonly limited to the record of the administration from
which the appeal is derived,206 this principle is not applied to § 145 civil
actions because they are de novo proceedings.207
This endeavor to hinder § 145 civil actions is visible in the USPTO’s
attempted use of 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) to restrict the court’s
consideration of § 145 actions.208 In BTG Intern. Ltd. v. Kappos,209 the
that based on the language “all expenses of the proceeding,” Congress intended the fixed costs
of a PTO attorney’s salary to be considered part of the proceeding, and shifted to the
applicants on a pro-rata basis. Whether the proceeding occurs or not, attorney salaries are
still an expense incurred by the USPTO, regardless of whether § 1071(b)(3) or § 145 civil
actions are commenced.
202
For discussion of Congress’s statutory intent, see supra Part IV.C.
203
566 U.S. 431 (2012).
204
Id. at 437.
205
Id. at 436.
206
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In making the [determination], the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.”).
207
See BTG Intern., 566 U.S. at 438.
208
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37.
209
No. 12-CV-00682, 2012 WL 6082910 (E.D.Va. Dec. 6, 2012).
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USPTO argued that 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) established that when a
patent applicant fails to present to the PTAB an argument “specifically
directed to the patentability of any specific patent claim,” the PTAB may
determine a “representative claim” upon which the rest of the claims’
patentability will be assessed.210 As a result, this would, in effect, restrict the
district court’s scope of review of a patent application in a § 145 civil action
by only allowing consideration of the “representative claim” determined by
the PTAB. In another defeat for the USPTO, the court held that 37 C.F.R. §
41.37 does not restrict the broad scope of a § 145 civil action.211 The court
noted that although the rule allowed the consolidation of all claims into a
single “representative claim” when an appeal is before the PTAB, that does
not restrict the district court to the “representative claim.”212
A proposed version of the Innovation Act213 included language that
would repeal § 145.214 The repeal would shift all civil actions that would
have been heard in the Eastern District of Virginia to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.215 With this process, the Innovation Act would
eliminate the de novo review that is allowed through § 145, and thereby
remove any possibility to introduce evidence outside what was required by
the PTAB at the time of application. This would tie the hands of appellants
to the record of the PTAB, making it far more difficult to vindicate their
rights. This proposal was likely in response to the decision in Kappos that
announced that applicants in § 145 civil actions can introduce further
evidence than what was relied upon by the USPTO.216 The aversion to the
established accessibility and flexibility that § 145 has allowed over the years
has been present throughout, and it continues today.
The attempted collection of attorney’s fees in § 145 civil actions came
after the aforementioned maneuvers failed to provide the USPTO with the
results it had sought. According to the USPTO, the collection of attorney’s
fees has always had Congressional blessing through the language of § 145,
210

Id. at *2.
See id. at *5–6.
212
Id. at *6.
213
H.R. REP. NO. 113-279 (2013). The version of the Innovation Act that was
successfully voted in the House to move to the Senate did not contain the proposed repeal of
§ 145, signaling a lack of appetite for such a measure at the time. See H.R. 3309, 113th Cong.
(2013).
214
H.R. REP. NO. 113-279 at 13 (proposing to repeal 35 U.S.C. § 145).
215
Id. (proposing to alter the language of 35 U.S.C. § 141, which would require all actions
be heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
216
See supra notes 203–207. The USPTO is not unfamiliar with lobbying Congress to
enact legislation favorable to their preferred method of operation. See H.R. 6758 Extends
Controversial USPTO Fee Authority, http://www.usinventor.org/2018/09/13/hr6758/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2019).
211
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yet prior to 2013 the USPTO has never attempted to collect attorney’s fees
under patent and trademark laws.217 The collection of attorney’s fees in this
context would be far more detrimental that beneficial. Although the USPTO
could not provide an exact number of § 145 civil actions each year,218 the
total attorney’s fees that the USPTO would recover would be minimal
compared to the chilling effect that would result from patent applicants
having to factor in the USPTO’s attorney’s fees in addition to their own
litigation expenses.219 Regardless of the supposed small number of § 145
civil actions over the years, allowing the USPTO to shift its attorney’s fees
would merely complicate an alternate, and already more expensive,220 path
to resolution should a patent applicant choose to do so. This same approach
can be applied to § 1071(b)(3); the attorney’s fees the USPTO would recover
would be a drop in the ocean compared to the chilling of trademark
applicants seeking a de novo civil action.221
The USPTO has repeatedly attempted to hinder § 145 civil actions,
whether it be through restricting the record that may be examined by the
court, restricting jurisdiction of the court by narrowing the claims, or
217

Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 230 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2015).
See Oral Argument at 19:19–20:10, Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (No. 2016-1794), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20 161794.mp3 (the USPTO failed to provide the number of § 145 civil actions within the last
twenty years, but estimates that there have been four to five § 145 civil actions in the past
three years).
219
The Nantkwest court offers a conservative calculation of the possible impact of
preventing the USPTO from collecting attorneys’ fees: assuming the USPTO litigates ten §
145 civil actions each year, with an average attorneys’ fees cost of $100,000, the total USPTO
expenditure would amount to $1 million per year. Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No.
18-801). Assuming that the number of patent applications meets the USPTO’s projections,
over 627,000, the attorneys’ fees costs incurred from litigating § 145 civil actions could be
alleviated with an application fee increase of $1.60 per application. Id.; see U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Justification 11 (2017)
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fy18pbr.pdf (projecting 627,274 patent
applications for the fiscal year 2018).
220
See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2018) (excluding the language “all expenses of the proceedings
shall be paid by the applicant”). The choice to pursue a § 145 civil action as opposed to a §
141 appeal already carries its own burdens for the patent applicant, allowing the USPTO to
recover more miscellaneous expenses.
221
The number of § 1071(b)(3) civil actions each year is unavailable. Assuming that the
number of § 1071(b)(3) civil actions is similar to the number of § 145 civil actions, the same
calculation can be done as in the Nantkwest court to estimate cost. With the same conservative
estimate of ten civil actions a year costing $1 million per year, and assuming that the number
of trademark applications meets the USPTO’s projections, 610,000, the attorneys’ fees costs
incurred from litigating § 1071(b)(3) civil actions could be alleviated with an application fee
increase of $1.64 per application. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2018
Congressional Justification 14 (2017) https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fy18pbr.pdf (projecting 610,000 trademark applications for the fiscal year 2018).
218
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attempting to have the section repealed entirely. When these attempts failed,
and despite previously never requesting attorney’s fees, the USPTO
attempted to collect attorney’s fees from a statute which required “expenses”
to be paid by the applicant.222 Suddenly, after 170 years, and coincidentally
after previous failed attempts to restrict §145, the USPTO has found meaning
that allegedly had been present the entire time, but they were unable to see
until recently.223 It appears that the USPTO would prefer to have greater
control over § 145 actions than is allowed, and is uninterested in review and
interference by the courts.224 The position of the USPTO is not only based
on an improper interpretation of the language “all expenses” and, to a certain
extent, reactionary to action by the courts, but also in contravention of
Congressional intent, and should be rejected.
V. CONCLUSION
The American Rule has been embedded in our legal system for over
200 years. Over time, we have recognized exceptions to the “pay your own
way” approach to attorney’s fees, and have respected Congress’s ability to
displace the American Rule where it sees fit. In the case of trademark and
patent application civil actions, it is wholly improper for courts to find that
the language that has been utilized in § 1071(b)(3) and § 145 would be
sufficient to displace the American Rule. Doing so is not only an affront to
the principles of the American Rule and its goal to allow greater access to
the legal system, but also disregards Congress’s presumed purposeful
drafting schemes and statutory constructions. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Nantkwest to settle this dispute,225 and the proper
222
35 U.S.C. § 145 (“All the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has explained that “shall” in statutory construction is
“ordinarily ‘the language of command,’” and that when “may” and “shall” are both used in a
statute, their ordinary meaning is that “may” is permissive and “shall” is mandatory.
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947).
223
See Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1189 n.5 (“[I]t is unclear why it took the [USPTO] more
than 170 years to appreciate the statute’s alleged clarity and seek the attorney’s fees that are
statutorily mandated under its interpretation.”).
224
See Miller & Archibald, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 498, 534 (2010) (“The
[USPTO’s] interpretative rulemaking and legislative lobbying on Capitol Hill reveal the
agency’s ultimate goal of making the [PTAB] for all intents and purposes the review-tribunal
of last resort tantamount to the status of an Article III court[.]”); Miller and Archibald also
posited that the USPTO would attempt to abolish district court review allowed by § 145 three
years prior to the USPTO attempting, and failing, to repeal it through congressional lobbying.
Id.; see supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text.
225
See Amy Howe, Justices Add Patent-Fees Case to Next Term’s Docket, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 4, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/justices-add-patent-feescase-to-next-terms-docket/. Andrei Iancu has recused from the case, and the Deputy Director
of the USPTO, Laura Peter, has been substituted as petitioner. The case is proceeding as Peter
v. Nantkwest.
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solution is clear: whether it be trademark application civil actions or patent
application civil actions, unless Congress decides to amend the statutes in
question, the Supreme Court should decline to allow for the recovery of
attorney’s fees based on vague, ill-defined statutory language insufficient
under Supreme Court precedent, which would do more harm than good.

